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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
BENJAMIN HAMPTON,
Plaintiff and AppelLant,

-vs.Case No. 9050
MARION H. ROWLJ<~Y and NORMA
ROWLEY, his wife, dba ROWLgY
BUILDERS SUPPLY,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRlHF OF APPELLAN1'

PRELIMINARY S'l'ATEMEKT
Throughout this Brief, plaintiff and appellant will
be referred to a:> ''Plaintiff" and defendant and respond"
ent, ~!arion H. .Howley. will be referred to a~ "Defendant." All Italics are ours.
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S'L'ATEME~'J'

OF FACTS

Defendants are the operators of a lumber yard and
building materials ,tore at 4350 South 9th East Street,
Salt Lake County, Utah.

On the 29th of March, 1958, which was a Saturday
at approximately 1:15 P.:M., plaintiff came to the store
of defendants and found the south portion thereof occupied by the father of defendant, Wilford H. Rowley.
Plaintiff knocked on the door of the portion of the building occupied by \Vilford H. Rowley and informed him of
the need which he had for three bags of cement. Wilford
II. Rowley inrormcd plaintiff that he could not help him
get the cement but if he wanted to get three bags of ce.ment he could do so. Plaintiff, thereupon, went through
the south portion of the defendants' establishment and
obtained a sack of cement. As he came out of the front
of the building and stepped on the step, his foot hit a
piece of gravel and plaintiff fell forward off the steps
onto the apron surrounding the steps and suffered a
sprain of his right foot and ankle.
Around the apron which \nt~ made of cement and the
steps leading- into the south portion of defendants' place
of busines,;, the defendant. <lW'I' tlw _,·ears, had spread a
gravel covering. Thi,.; covering had been maintained ami
raised aH defendants du111pcd additional gravel on the
an•a ('l'. Sl, 82). Defendant had on the premi,.;e~ hand
tm<'k~ l'or uo>l' in caiT~·ing henYy materials but plaintiff
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was not furni:;hed with such a truck to assist him in getting the cement which he purchased out of the defendants'
place of business (T. 92). After plaintiff had received
the cement he paid Wilford H. Rowley for the articles
and left the place of business of defendants.
The case came on for trial before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux on the 15th day of December, 1958. Plaintiff presented his evidence and defendants presented their
evidence and the Court instructed the Jury. A verdict
of No Cause of Action was rendered.

SD-1.\tARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTION NO. 11-A, SUBpARAGRAPH C.

ARGU:MEN'l'
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTION NO. 11-A, SUBpARAGRAPH C.

After the Jmy had retired, the ~ourt prepared In~truction 11-_\ and punmant to a Stipulation of Counsel
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for both parties gave 11-A to the Jury while they were

in the Jury room.
Plaintiff had no objection to the procedure followed
by the Court but did object to the Instruction 11-A and

particularly that portion of the instruction which read
as follows:
That defendant knew, or in the exercise
or reasonable care should have known, the rock
was on the step."
"(a)

In many of the slipping and falling cases where a perBOD is a guest, or business visitor, the laws require that
before negligence can be found on the part of the store
owner there must be evidence from which the ,Jury could
find that the owner knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
care _should have known of the dangerous condition. The
case at bar is an exception to this rule. Knowledge is not
required under the facts of this caf'.t>, and it is error to
require such a finding on the part of a Jury.
·where the owner of the store has intentionally and
voluntarily created the dangerous condition no knowledge
1s necessary.
1'here is no dispute about the fact that defendants
hauled in the gravel along the front of their store and
('J"euted the dangerous situation. GravE'! from the area
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irrunediately adjacent to the steps on which plaintiff fell
would, under ordinary use, slop over on to the steps.
It is submitted that the Jury could find that in the normal
ordinary use of the gravel-covered area and the steps
that pieces of gravel would be deposited on the steps
and create and constitute a dangerous condition.
Plaintiff submits that the present case is within the
principle which this Court announced in De Weese v.
J. C. Penney Company, 5 U.2d 116, 297 P.2d 898. The
Court's opinion written by ,Justice Crockett contains the
following pertinent statement of the general principle
wlrich plaintiif submito is applicable:
"(3) This case differs from those involving
a foreign substance such as spilled oil or grease,
or where a pool of water is allowed to accumulate,
creating a hazardous condition which, under most
circumstances, is easily observable to the business
invitee as the store ov..-ner. The terrazzo surfaeing is part of the permanent structure of the building. While it is true that the construction and
maintenance of the entranceway of terrazzo on an
inclined plane does not of itself constitute negligence, it comes v.-ithin the rule thai a negligent act
may be one which 'creates a situation which involves an unrea.\'onable risk to another because of
the expectable action of the other, a third person,
an animal or a force of nature.'"

ln the DeW ~;e,;e case we are concerned, of course,
with water being Jeposited on a terrazzo :;urflli'e and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
having it thereby rendered slick and sli-ppery. As the
Court indicates, a similar situation would exist if the
deposit causing the surface to be dangerous came on the
premises as a result of a third person's activity, so. long
as such activity might be reasonably anticipated.

A case, perhaps more closely analagous to the pres"
ent case on its facts than the DeWeese case is Falconer
vs. Safeway Stores, Inc., 49 \V. 2d 478, 303 P.2d 294
·which involved the Safeway Stores, Inc., removing its
garbage in cans. There, the facts indicate that the
plaintiff was injured within a very few moments of the
time that the suet on which she slipped was actually
placed on the sidewalk. The defendants contend that
unless they had notice of the dangerous condition of the
premises they would not be liable. The Washington Supreme Court, in distinguishing the notice cases from
the case at bar stated as follows:
The notice i10 for the purpose of showing
that the occupant was aware of the condition of
the premise~;;, which was created by others, and
negligently permitted it to continue thereafter.
"*._.,

The rule requiring SV!Ch notice is not applicable
where the danger01!S Qondition o_t the pre·mises was
created in_ the first instance by the occupant.
The neqli(Jrucr in the instant cac<l:' consists of
rrrafi11_1; a· da119<'1ous conditiou, not in permitting
it to ("Ulltinue. One is prc~umed to know what one

does."
lnstrud.ion Ko. 11 pla<.•e,; the present case Wlth the
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eases where the dangerous condition is not created by
the voluntary and intentional acts of the defendant, and
as a consequence, the Jury would be required to find
against plaintiff unless plaintiff showed by a preponderance of evidence that defendants knew that the rock on
which he stepped was on its front step. Plaintiff respectfully submit8 that this was prejudicial error on the part
of the Court and that as a consequence this Court should
reverse the Trial court and grant to the plaintiff a new
trial.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court should
reverse the trial court and order a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
KINU AND HUGHES
Attorneys for Appellant
2121 So. State Street
Salt .Lake City, Lftah
No. 205 Sentinel Building

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

